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This article focuses on how
Olbrects-Tyteca's 
intersubjectivity (
(Gross, 1999), and disassociation 
Gross's scholarship synthesizes his thought and shows how he
offers a novel Perelmanian framework
Several features persist in Gross’s Perelmanian rhetorical 
theory.  For Gross, 
theory.  In the beginning of his i
that an “absolutist view of scientific truth has been generally 
superseded by a sophisticated and all
truth depends not on conformity to 
intersubjective agreement among significant persons
69), a claim that is built on 
This review surveys a Perelmanian sense of rhetorical audience as 
generative of the work of rhetors.
Building on this intersubjectivity, he claims
that “at this point in our intellectual history it would be futile to 
argue that either philosophy or science is value
207).  Gross acknowledges fluidity 
various discourses and how values relate to or establish access to 
the truth about reality. Gross is keen to point
and science are no longer activities considered separate from being 
value laden; they are no
Grasping the Perelmanian framework Gross has in mind is a 
bulwark against claims that science or philosophy is not rhetorical.  
While this special issue is built on Gross’s claims that science is 
rhetorical, this review traces this perspective to Perelmanian roots.
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Intersubjectivity and Audience as the Core 
Concepts in a Perelmanian Rhetorical Theory 
In his article “Analogy and Intersubjectivity: Political Oratory, 
Scholarly Argument, and Scientific Reports,” Gross points to the 
idea that “political oratory need not appeal to intellect [but that] 
intersubjective agreement which it seeks […] can be reached almost 
entirely through the emotional use of analogy” (Gross 1983, 39).  At 
a distance from appealing to the universal audience, Gross says that 
pathetic appeals in political speech still work because of 
intersubjective agreement.  Intersubjective agreement moves closer 
to appeals that are aimed at convincing a universal audience 
because, as Gross argues, apt analogies can move toward universal 
appeal “depend[ing] upon the analogy's "embodiment of basic 
human motivations" which gives it a universal appeal on which the 
speaker can rely” (Gross, 1983, 39).  Here, Gross surely has in mind 
Perelman's universal audience as the arbiter of what counts as a 
universal appeal. 
The primary focus of “Analogy and Intersubjectivity” is to argue 
and demonstrate that intersubjective agreement, or individual 
minds aligning along a set of shared beliefs and actions, is a 
rhetorical mode of knowledge production distinct from 
foundational epistemological theories of knowledge.  And, 
producing scholarly or scientific knowledge is “rhetorical only by 
analogy” to the ways in which political oratory is rhetorical (Gross 
1983, 45) if only because all three communicative acts partake in 
the use of analogy as productive means to reach the universal 
audience.  The major difference among the three modes of 
communication is that all three have an increased access to the 
universal audience through their uses of appeals, with Gross 
demonstrating political rhetoric as having the least and scientific 
having the greatest access. This does not mean that political 
discourse does not submit claims to a universal audience, as I 
suggested above; it's simply a discourse with an intersubjective 
agreement that hews closer to emotions and values.   
For Gross, some forms of discourse have increased or decreased 
access to appeals that seek to adhere minds to the standards of the 
universal audience.  In 1999, Gross reflected on Perelman's notion 
of audience and theorized how speakers construct the audience to 
be, at times, particular while at other moments of a discourse the 
speaker projects claims for an universal audience.  In the article, “A 
Theory of Rhetorical Audience: Reflections on Chaïm Perelman,” 
Gross acknowledges the controversy surrounding the application 
and the theoretical consistency of the universal audience, but he 
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asserts that the concept of the universal audience is “part of a 
theoretically coherent concept of audience with considerable 
potential as a tool for rhetorical criticism” (Gross, 1999, 203).  The 
theoretical coherency of Perelman's idea of audience stems from 
Gross's claim that audience is “a synthetic unity [that] must be a 
consequence of the speaker's intuition” where “speakers must 
embody their best guesses of their audiences' view of the two 
components” of what is and what ought or could be (Gross, 1999, 
204).  Thus Gross reads Perelman's theory so that claims of fact, 
truth, or presumption orient towards the universal audience and 
claims of value are directed at particular audiences.  Again, it is 
worth stressing that this thematization occurs, one imagines, 
during the course of inventing, arranging, stylizing, memorizing 
and delivering an address as a consequence of the intuitive 
capacity of the speaker.  
In this article, the sense that claims have motion is not exactly 
Gross's meaning.  Instead, he theorizes that speaker's claims are 
"thematized" in ways that make them directed toward a universal 
audience, if, thematically, claims direct the audience towards facts, 
truth or presumptions.  On the other hand, claims that are 
thematically bound to values are claims directed toward particular 
audiences. Much as in his article on intersubjectivity, Gross's 
interpretation of a rhetorical audience in light of Perelman's theory 
makes the kinds of address distinct from one another to tease out a 
sense of what might characterize a discourse as oriented toward 
either universal or particular audiences and concludes that “public 
address represents a mixture of goals, and therefore of rhetorical 
audiences” (Gross, 1999, 210).  Thus Gross shows that speakers’ 
intuitions characterize discourses and create a “synthetic unity,” a 
best guess to thematize claims for both universal and particular 
audiences.  Presumably successfully thematized claims fit the 
occasion and meet the exigencies of the public address.   
In addition to pointing to a speaker's intuition that thematizes, 
Gross details how Perelman's theory of audience is clearer if we 
hold that there is a distinction between the real and the preferable, 
which also must be part of that intuition that thematizes.  Gross 
aligns this distinction with Perelman's insight that convincing is to 
be distinct from persuading so that one is convinced of the real 
while that the preferable entails a matter of value (e.g. one could 
prefer to think “I am not,” but, alas, making the claim that one is 
not one affirms that one still is).  While particular audiences are 
urged that this or that value ought to be the case (i.e. a preference), 
the universal audience is convinced this or that is or is not the case.  
To put the point of being convinced and being persuaded to rest, 
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Gross suggests that “discourse that emphasizes, that thematizes, 
values can never address a universal audience because particular 
values can never be plausibly asserted as binding on all human 
beings in all circumstances” (Gross, 1999, 207).  What this means in 
part is that a speaker makes a good guess at what the synthetic 
whole is that the audience will prefer and know as real. This entails 
that the universal audience consists of those who are convinced by 
how a speaker's intuition and best guesses fit with what is.  
Taken together, these two articles demonstrate how Gross 
interprets Perelman's ideas so that audiences are comprised by the 
speaker's intuition of disparate individuals.  To become an 
incarnation of the universal audience an audience must share a 
kind of agreement, must have followed a theme where the real is 
distinguishable from the preferable, where values are different from 
facts, truths, or presumptions, and must become more or less 
universal at times within political discourse.  That ability to share 
something, to follow thematizations of the real from the preferable, 
and to become more or less universal at times is the ability to be 
reasonable.  By reading Gross's scholarship on Perelman in this 
way, one method for ascertaining the reasonableness of claims 
measures them against their thematization of values, facts, as best 
as the critic can grasp the ability of the speaker to intuit and project 
a synthetic unity of audience persuaded and convinced. 
The Realm of Rhetoric in a Perelmanian 
Rhetorical Theory 
Gross’s “Rhetoric as a Technique and a Mode of Truth” works to 
memorialize one of Perelman's first American commentators by 
taking up an issue Henry Johnstone had had with Perelman's text.  
To establish that the aims of The New Rhetoric has truth in its 
sights, Johnstone asks a perennial question that is still a live issue 
among rhetoricians and philosophers, namely, whether rhetoric is a 
technique or a mode of truth.  While Gross wisely does not answer 
Johnstone's question directly because much of the history of 
Western Philosophy is tangled up in this issue, I believe Gross’s 
answer constitutes a “yes.”  Under the best conditions rhetoric is a 
mode of truth and the movement of disassociation helps propel 
discourses like philosophy and science beyond the realm of 
particular values into the sphere of universality where rational 
beings consider truth.   
The purpose of “Rhetoric as a Technique and a Mode of Truth” 
is to highlight how disassociation is employed in various discourses 
ranging from political addresses to philosophical and scientific 
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treatises. Gross demonstrates how political, philosophical and 
scientific discourses employ disassociation.  Notably, philosophical 
and scientific discourses use disassociation along with other 
rhetorical devices to secure a grasp on the truth or reality of what is 
at issue within each discourse.   As Gross interprets Perelman, 
philosophical discourses use disassociation and attendant 
rhetorical devices to separate the work of one philosopher or 
philosophic school from those that have been established before or 
those that may come in the future.  For examples, Gross reads 
seminal philosophical texts that have as their foci questions about 
claims that method arrives at truth and thus at knowledge.  He 
demonstrates that Plato and Descartes both use disassociation to 
separate their ideas from competing theories of how and what we 
can know. 
Gross extends Perelman's work on disassociation within 
scientific discourse to claim by analogy that the scientific method is 
“one [device] in a class of means by which science discovers its 
truths” (Gross, 2000, 331).  In other words, the scientific method is, 
in part, marked by moves we can classify as disassociative, thereby 
marking scientific discourses as, in part, rhetorical.   
Conclusion 
Gross' reading of Perelman provides a useful framework for 
rhetorical criticism.  Gross's  scholarship provides a usable method 
for rethinking particular and universal audiences for rhetorical 
criticism.  His work also provides an articulation of the role of 
association and disassociation by demonstrating that a wide range 
of discourses function rhetorically.  Gross's reading of Perelman 
also provides important infrastructure for understanding his larger 
project. 
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